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We analyze the impact of individualization on productivity growth within an augmented neo-
classical growth model framework.  Our estimation results using a panel data covering 15 
transition countries over the period 1990-2001 and applying a GMM-IV estimator support the 
view that the shift to individual farming, as well as the overall economic reforms, have 
positively contributed to the productivity growth of transition agriculture.   
 
 
Key words: agriculture, individual farming, productivity, economic transition 





Paper prepared for the 2004 Annual Meeting of  
the American Agricultural Economics Association,  
















Copyright 2004 by Marian Rizov. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for 
non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
   1




A current policy objective of the governments in transition economies is to increase 
productivity and growth.  Recent country assistance strategies and structural adjustment loans 
from the World Bank (e.g., World Bank 2001a and 2001b) have pushed these governments to 
reduce subsidies and price interventions, and impose hard budget constraints by letting the 
private sector control production and marketing. 
Economic reforms have induced important output and productivity changes in the 
agricultural sectors of transition economies as well.  However, there are large differences 
across countries with respect to productivity growth, measured as the growth of agricultural 
output per worker, and the corresponding scope of farm restructuring and shift to individual 
farms, defined as the share of total agricultural land cultivated individually.  For example, 
cumulative productivity growth, after ten years of reforms in Czech Republic is 85% with 
corresponding level of individualization at 26%.  While in Albania the individualization level 
is 90% but the cumulative productivity growth is less than 10%, for the same period.   
Furthermore, in many countries there is even decline in agricultural productivity while 
individualization remained low.  In Russia, for example, there is almost 30% cumulative 
decline of output per worker while the share of individual farming is only 13% and collective 
farms still dominate (see table 1).
1  Thus it is not unambiguously clear from the raw statistical 
numbers if individualization helps productivity growth in transition agriculture.   
There are only a few studies related to the impact of individualization on agricultural 
performance in transition countries.  Macours and Swinnen (2000a and 2000b) and Lerman 
(2000 and 2001) in their analyses of output and productivity changes in agriculture during 
transition find mixed evidence.  Furthermore, there is an ongoing institutional debate   2
concerning the effects of individualization as a policy for restructuring former socialist 
countries’ agriculture.  On the one hand, consultants and international institutions, such as the 
World Bank support individualization of agriculture as reform policy that leads to higher 
productivity by solving incentive and organizational problems of collective farming (e.g., 
Deininger 1993 and 1995).  On the other hand, a number of local policy makers are not 
convinced in the usefulness of the shift to individual farming and blame this policy for 
fragmentation and disorganization along the supply chain.
2  Therefore contributing to this 
important for agricultural reforms debate is timely and requires more thorough investigation.  
Clearly, shifting production from collective to individual farms merits attention also because 
it has much wider implications beyond agriculture, specifically for rural development, land 
use and the environment as a whole.   
In this paper we analyze the impact of individualization on agricultural productivity 
growth within a (Solow) growth model framework and closely following Rizov 
(forthcoming).  This approach allows us to circumvent criticisms on the grounds of lack of 
theoretical and objective criteria for inclusion of various explanatory variables (e.g., Durlauf 
and Quah; Brock and Durlauf).  In particular, this criticism seems relevant for the transition 
growth analyses as major variables affecting growth (e.g. investment) are often excluded 
from the estimations.  Furthermore, in the empirical analysis using a generalized method of 
moments (GMM-IV) estimator and panel data covering 15 transition countries over the 
period 1990-2001 we are able to control for unobserved country-specific effects and 
endogeneity of the variables.
3  Our estimation results are robust to various assumptions and 
support the view that the shift to individual farming has positively contributed to the 
productivity growth in agriculture during the first decade of transition.   
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The heritage of transition agriculture and hypothesis 
Land reform and farm restructuring are important components of economic reforms because 
agriculture’s share in transition economies has traditionally been much higher than in the 
market economies.  The former socialist countries were also more agrarian than non-socialist 
countries with comparable levels of income per capita.  In the pre-transition decade of 1980s, 
the mean share of agriculture in GDP for former socialist countries was 21%, compared with 
14% for non-socialist countries with similar per-capita income.   
A common trend in former socialist countries pre-reform was that in the 1980s growth 
rates (for both GDP and agricultural output) were significantly lower compared with similar 
non-socialist countries.  In fact this was a continuation of a trend that began in the 1960s: the 
annual growth rates of agricultural production, e.g., in the USSR as a whole dropped from 
4% in 1966-1970 to 1% in 1981-1985.  This was a particularly alarming trend because 
investment in agriculture continued at relatively high and increasing levels: Soviet 
agriculture’s share in total investment increased from 21% in 1966-1970 to 24% in 1981-
1985 (Cook; Lerman et al.).  New investments in agriculture were thus producing decreasing 
marginal returns and failed to sustain sectoral growth. 
Economic growth in agriculture, as well as in the whole economy, was accomplished 
mainly through increasing the use of inputs and capital, and not through productivity 
increases (Ofer).  Johnson and Brooks who analyze the technical efficiency of socialist 
agriculture using data for all fifteen republics of the USSR over 1960-1979 period show that 
the productivity level of socialist agriculture was substantially lower than that in market 
economies.
4  The partial productivity of agricultural land in former socialist countries, as 
measured by the gross output of agricultural products per hectare, was somewhat higher than 
the partial productivity of land in market economies.  However, socialist and market 
agriculture differed primarily in the productivity of agricultural labor.  For instance, labor   4
productivity was lower by a factor of ten or more in the USSR compared with the US and 
Canada.  This low productivity of agricultural labor is clearly a reflection of the very high 
labor use.   
The centrally planned environment, which insulated the farms from market signals, 
imposed central targets as a substitute for consumer preferences, and allowed farms to 
function indefinitely under soft budget constraints without proper profit accountability, was 
the main cause of inefficiency of socialist agriculture (Kornai).  Besides, efficiency was never 
an objective in socialist agriculture: meeting production targets at any cost was the main 
priority.  Yet the inefficiency of socialist agriculture also can be attributed to two “micro-
level” factors, which sharply distinguished socialist agriculture from agriculture in market 
economies: exceptionally large farm sizes and collective organization of production (Lerman 
et al.).   
The strategy of agricultural transition in former socialist countries aimed to improve 
the efficiency and productivity of agriculture by replacing the institutional and organizational 
features of the command economy with attributes borrowed from the practice of market 
economies (Lerman 1999).  The ideal transition agenda formulated in the early 1990’s 
envisaged a transformation from collective to more efficient individualized agriculture as the 
ultimate goal.  Individual farmers, once established as independent entities, would engage in 
land-market transactions to optimize the size of the holdings given their managerial skills and 
availability of resources (e.g., Binswanger et al.; Deininger 1995; Lerman 1998; Mathijs and 
Swinnen 1998; Rizov et al.; Rizov 2003).  This process would lead to increase in efficiency 
and productivity, and ultimately result in growth of incomes.   
Therefore, the goal of this paper is to analyze the impact of the shift of land to 
individual farms on productivity growth in agriculture.  The hypothesis is that 
individualization would positively influence agricultural productivity due to the higher   5
efficiency of the individual family farm organization.  Besides, individualization may have 
also an indirect effect on agricultural productivity growth resulting from more efficient 
reallocation of resources across farm organizations.  We test empirically this hypothesis in 
the next section within a Solow endogenous growth model framework.   
 
Methodology and data 
The Solow growth model and dynamic panel data estimation 
In the Solow model growth in output per worker depends on the initial output per worker 
(q(0)), the initial level of technology (A(0)), the rate of technological progress (a), the 
savings/investment rate (s), the growth rate of the labor force (l), the depreciation rate (d), the 
share of capital in output (k), and the rate of convergence to steady state (C).  The model 
predicts that a high savings/investment rate will affect growth positively, whereas high labor 
force growth (corrected by the rate of technological progress and the rate of depreciation) will 
have a negative effect on growth.
5  The model is specified in the following way: 
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Possible estimation techniques for this model are cross-section regressions using 
averaged data for long periods (e.g., Barro; Mankiw et al.; Sala-i-Martin) or a dynamic panel 
data approach (e.g., Islam; Caselli et al.).  Single cross-section growth regressions have 
several disadvantages: (i) the time series are reduced to a single observation means and not 
all available information is used; (ii) it is very likely that single cross-section regressions 
suffer from omitted variable bias; (iii) one or more of the regressors may be endogenous.  
Within a dynamic panel data framework (e.g., Hansen; Arellano and Bond) it is possible to 
account for unobserved country specific effects and allow for endogeneity of the regressors.  
Therefore we take this approach in estimating the impact of individualization on the growth   6
of gross agricultural output per worker (GAO
w).  The panel data model takes the following 
form: 
it i it it it x q g ε ν γ β α + + + + = −1 ,       (2) 
where git denotes the growth rate of GAO
w for country i (i=1,…I) in time t (t=2,…T), qit-1 is 
the level of GAO
w at the beginning of each period, and xit is a vector of regressors such as 
investment rate and population growth, following the Solow model.  Furthermore, as in most 
empirical studies that are based on more general models we include a range of other socio-
economic variables (see further).  These variables are either initial values or average values 
over each time period.  The time-invariant unobserved country-specific effects and the 
random error term are denoted νi and εit, respectively.   
From (1) and (2) the dynamic panel data model can be rewritten in the following way: 
it i it it it it x q q q ε ν γ β α + + + + = − − − 1 1 ,       (2’) 
it i it it it x q q ε ν γ β α + + + + = −1 * ,       (3) 
where β*=(β+1). 
In order to address inconsistency problems due to (i) omitted unobserved time 
invariant country effects (Hsiao), (ii) small number of time-series periods, T (Nickell), and 
(iii) correlations between regressors and νi and/or εit we apply the first differenced GMM 
estimator.  Taking first differences of (3) eliminates the country specific effects νi, 
it it it it x q q ε γ β ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ −1 * .      (4) 
Assuming that error terms are independent across countries and serially uncorrelated 
(E[εitεip]=0 for p≠t) and that the initial conditions satisfy E[qi1εit]=0 for t≥2, the values of qit 
lagged two periods or more are valid instruments in the first differenced growth equation.  
This is so because qit-2 and earlier values are generally correlated with ∆qit-1 but not with ∆εit.    7
Thus, qit-1 is predetermined with respect to εit, i.e. shocks to GAO
w in one time period are not 
correlated with initial GAO
w of this time period.   
If the regressors xit are strictly exogenous (E[xitεip]=0 for all p,t) then all the past, 
present and future values of xit are valid instruments in each of the differenced equations, 
even if the xit are correlated with νi.  However, it is likely that some of the regressors in our 
model, e.g. policies and policy outcomes, may not be strictly exogenous.  There may be a 
feedback mechanism where past shocks to GAO
w are correlated with current policies and/or 
outcomes.  Maintaining the assumption that current shocks to GAO
w are uncorrelated with 
current policies/outcomes would mean that E[xitεip]≠0 for p<t and E[xitεip]=0 for p≥t.  
Following Arellano and Bond we can then use values of the predetermined xit lagged one 
period or more as valid instruments in the first differenced growth equation.   
If a regressor is endogenous then we have to allow for correlation between the current 
value of this regressor and current shocks to GAO
w, as well as feedback from past shocks to 
GAO
w, i.e. E[xitεip]≠0 for p≤t and E[xitεip]=0 for p>t only.  In this case, valid instruments in 
the differenced equations are values of the endogenous xit, lagged two periods or more.  
Finally, we have to address the issue of how to treat time-invariant country-specific 
characteristics such as initial conditions, type of land reform adopted, etc.  If we include 
measured time-invariant country characteristics (wi) in the analysis the growth equation (3) 
becomes:  it i i it it it w x q q ε ν δ γ β α + + + + + = −1 * .   
Since the measured country-specific characteristics (wi) may be correlated with the 
unobserved country-specific effects (νi) and/or the error term (εit) we estimate the model in 
two steps, similarly to Blanchflower et al. and Battese and Coelli, in order to evaluate the 
impact of country-specific observed characteristics on GAO
w.  First, we estimate equation (3) 
without including the measured country-specific characteristics, wi, i.e., we replace 
νi*=δwi+νi for νi.  In the estimation we allow qit-1 and xit to be correlated with νi* so that   8
there is no “omitted variable bias” resulting from omission of wi.  The consistent GMM 
estimates  * β  and γ  are then used to calculate the residuals of equation (3).  In the second 
step we regress these residuals on the measured country-specific characteristics, wi: 
) ( ) * ( 1 it i i it it it v w x q q ε δ γ β α + + = − − − − .      (5) 
The OLS levels estimation of equation (5) will generate a consistent estimate of δ iff 
all wi characteristics are uncorrelated with νi which is a very strong assumption.  Therefore 
we cannot attach much casual significance to the estimate of δ .  The advantage of this two-
step procedure, however, is that we obtain consistent estimates of the β* and γ coefficients 
which is the major goal of our analysis.   
 
Data and variables 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the experience of a selected sample of 15 transition countries
6 
for which comparable agricultural sector annual data are available over the period 1990-2001.
7  
However, data is not available for all countries for all years, thus making the panel unbalanced.  
As the sample covers selected countries of the Balkans, Baltics, Central Europe and the CIS, and 
includes the most up-to-date information available, we are able to also test whether the main 
conclusions from previous studies related to (agricultural) sector performance are still valid after 
more than ten years of transition.  
We measure productivity growth in agriculture in terms of growth of the gross 
agricultural output per worker, GAO
w.  According to the Solow model it seems more 
appropriate to use per worker rather than per capita variables, because the model is based on 
a production function and not every person from the country’s population contributes to 
production.  Contrary to previous empirical studies that focused on average changes in the 
early years of transition (e.g., Macours and Swinnen 2000a and 2000b; Lerman 2000), we 
consider year-on-year changes in GAO
w.  By looking at growth rates in agricultural   9
production per worker in each country at a given point in time we are able to capture the high 
heterogeneity across countries as it appears from table 1.  
We explain GAO
w growth in terms of the main factors identified in equation (1), i.e., 
the initial level of GAO
w, the changes in the agricultural labor force (adjusted for the rate of 
depreciation and the rate of technological progress) and the savings/investment in the sector.  
In addition, we control for initial conditions and general economic reforms.  Thus the impact 
of the factor in the focus of this analysis - the individualization of agricultural production – 
can be isolated.  
GAO
w is measured in purchasing power parity adjusted US dollars and was calculated 
by using the initial, 1990 level of agricultural GDP obtained from EBRD database and the FAO 
annual output index over the period 1990-2001.  The annual data for agricultural labor force is 
from countries’ National Statistics and ILO.  Due to lack of any other more appropriate measure, 
we proxy the savings/investment rate, s by the ratio of output and input agriculture-specific 
prices.  This ratio is a good proxy for the gross margin that is closely related to the availability of 
internal funds.  Under conditions of imperfect financial market and credit constraints the 
sensitivity of investment to internal financing is shown to be high (see e.g., Fazzari et al.).  The 
average labor force growth rate, l was computed as the difference between the natural logarithms 
of agricultural labor force at the end and beginning of each year.  
It is implicitly assumed, as in other panel data studies (Islam; Caselli et al.) that the rate 
of technological progress is common to all countries and allowed for unobserved differences in 
the initial level of technology.  Assuming that the level of technology is common to all countries 
can be justified for the economies in transition by the fact that there were explicit policies 
towards equalization of countries within the former COMECOM.   
We recognize that the diffusion of new technology is likely to be costly and takes a 
considerable period of time (e.g., Kershenas and Stoneman).  Furthermore, if the diffusion of   10
new technology is not costless and instantaneous, we may want also to allow for different rates 
of technological progress in different countries.  However, due to lack of data we have to 
maintain the standard assumption of a common rate of technical change as in a number of 
previous studies.  Note that our controls for progress of reforms and restructuring ameliorate this 
restriction to certain extent.  Thus, like it is common in the literature (e.g., Islam; Mankiw et al.; 
Caselli et al.), the natural logarithm of the sum of labor force growth and 0.05 (for constant 
technological progress and depreciation rate) is calculated for ln (l+a+d).  
Further, we augment the model with a control variable measuring effects of general 
economic reforms as well as with the measure of individualization.  Progress in general 
economic reforms (REFORM) is measured as the average of the EBRD indicators for price and 
trade liberalization, and small-scale privatization.
8  These indicators capture the extensiveness of 
the so-called “first phase” reforms, which are necessary condition for the successful 
implementation of institutional reforms.   
Finally, we measure the extent of farm restructuring by looking at the share of total 
agricultural land that is used in individual (private) farms (INDIVID).  This is the variable of 
main interest in our analysis.  We use data from countries’ National Statistics and Macours and 
Swinnen (2000a) as the values were calculated in natural logarithms.  
Country-specific time-invariant characteristics are eliminated in the first differenced 
GMM estimator, as we showed in equation (4).  Therefore, in a second (auxiliary) step of the 
analysis we regress the residuals, calculated from the consistent GMM estimates, on the fixed 
country-specific observed characteristics.  These characteristics are measured by two synthetic 
indexes of initial conditions.
9  These indexes summarize a number of variables describing the 
status of former socialist countries’ economies at the beginning of transition.  The first index 
(IC1) can be interpreted as a measure of inherited distortions.  Positive values of this index 
indicate lower initial distortions. The second initial conditions’ index (IC2) captures the degree   11
of development of the economy.  Higher values of this index characterize countries with higher 
initial development and thus better initial conditions.   
 
Results and discussion 
The results of GMM-IV estimations based on the Solow growth model as specified in 
equation (1) are reported in table 2.  All regressions include time dummies (not reported as 
well as the constant), which were found to be jointly significant in every regression.  There is 
no second order serial correlation (the m2-test) and the Sargan test does not reject the validity 
of instruments in all specifications.  The left hand side variable is the change in the logarithm 
of real per worker agricultural output (GAO
w).   
First, a regression corresponding to the textbook Solow model was run (results in 
column (1)).  All variables are significant at the one per cent level and have the expected 
signs.  The negative coefficient on initial GAO
w as in most published work is interpreted as 
conditional convergence while investment is positive and growth of labor force is negative as 
suggested by the Solow model.
10  The implied speed of convergence (C) is quite high at 
about seven per cent per annum, not surprising for the case of economic transition.  It seems 
that the most important determinant of the growth in agricultural productivity is the reduction 
in excess labor, which is interpreted as an indicator of passive restructuring while active 
restructuring is defined as new investment (Coricelli and Djankov).  
Next, we run regressions augmented with measures of progress in economic reforms 
and of individualization of agricultural production in order to assess their effects on 
productivity growth.  In column (2) results of an augmented version of the Solow model, with 
a measure of general economic reforms (REFORM), are reported.  The results of the base 
regression hold while the coefficient of the reform variable is significant at the five per cent 
level and positive as expected.  REFORM is a synthetic indicator of policy outcomes and   12
reform policies adopted, measuring the advancement in general economic reforms.  As in 
other studies it is interpreted as an important condition for successful restructuring of the 
agricultural sector (Macours and Swinnen 2000a and 2000b; Lerman 2000 and 2001).  We 
recognize that the impact of reforms is affected by policy choices and initial conditions.  It is 
not the goal of our analysis, however, to distinguish between these effects.  In the second 
(auxiliary) step of the analysis we test for the direct impact of initial conditions on 
productivity growth.  
Individualization of agricultural production is an important indicator of restructuring 
in agriculture.  It is the major outcome of the agriculture-specific land reform policies 
adopted.  Some countries adopted the restitution method (mainly central European and 
Balkan countries, except Albania, Poland and Slovenia) while others distributed property 
rights through paper shares (CIS).  Albania stands out as the only country in our sample that 
followed the approach of distributing land in the form of physical plots.  Poland and Slovenia 
do not fall into any of these three categories because they started the transition with large 
proportions of land already in individual farms, and did not introduce any substantial land 
reform afterwards.  The importance of these land reform choices is in the fact that they have 
resulted in different magnitude of the shift of land to individual farms (INDIVID).  Thus by 
assessing the impact of individualization on productivity growth we can provide an implicit 
evaluation of the success of land reform policies adopted.   
Results in column (3) from estimating a Solow model augmented with INDIVID 
show that individualization is important for productivity growth.  The coefficients on the base 
variables are as in previous model specifications, with respect to sign and magnitude while 
the coefficient on the individualization variable is positive and significant at the one per cent 
level.  This result is important because we find a positive effect of individualization in a   13
dynamic model controlling for investment and changes in the labor force, which are the most 
important factor of the agricultural sector transformation during the period of analysis.
11   
In column (4) we report results from a Solow model specification augmented with 
both REFORM and INDIVID.  Again the results from the base specification are maintained 
and the impact of both REFORM and INDIVID is positive and significant.  The speed of 
conditional convergence (C) doubled when both economic reforms and restructuring of farms 
through individualization are implemented.  This result is robust to alternative treatments of 
INDIVID as exogenous or endogenous.   
Previous studies (Macours and Swinnen 2000a and 2000b; Falcetti et al.) have 
emphasized the importance of initial conditions in determining performance during transition.  
Their results show that the impact of initial conditions is stronger with respect to gross output 
while it is vague with respect to labor productivity.  In a similar to several studies manner, 
including the ones mentioned above, we test for the impact of initial conditions (IC1 and IC2) 
on productivity growth in a second step of our analysis.  As specified in equation (5) we 
regress the residuals, calculated from the GMM-IV estimation (column (4)), on the initial 
conditions IC1 and IC2.  The results are presented in table 3 and show that the initial 
conditions do not affect productivity growth at any reasonable level of significance.   
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we address the question whether individualization of agricultural production as 
measured by the share of total agricultural land used in individual farms helps productivity.  
The main result that individualization does positively affect productivity growth is robust to 
alternative treatments with respect to endogeneity assumptions.  Advantage of our approach 
is that we analyze this relationship within the well-defined theoretical framework of the 
augmented Solow growth model.  Furthermore, using panel data and a first differenced   14
GMM-IV estimator we are able to obtain consistent coefficient estimates and to control for 
endogeneity and unobserved country-specific effects.   
Our results have a number of important policy implications.  First, we cast light on an 
important institutional debate concerning the appropriateness of policies aiming at 
individualization of agriculture in transition economies.  Applying a robust theoretical and 
empirical framework we are able to qualify so far inconclusive results of other studies 
(Macours and Swinnen 2000a and 2000b; Lerman 2000 and 2001) and prove that the shift to 
individual farms has had a positive impact on productivity growth in transition countries.  
Second, investment and the reduction in excess labor, which are associated with active and 
passive restructuring, respectively (Coricelli and Djankov) are found to be very important 
determinants of the productivity growth in transition agriculture.  Third, our analysis 
confirms previous findings (Macours and Swinnen 2000a and 2000b; Falcetti et al.) that 
economic reforms positively affect productivity while differences in initial conditions do not 
have important impact after more than ten years of transition.     15
Notes 
1 Macours and Swinnen (2000b) identify three patterns according to agricultural performance, 
measured by gross agricultural output (GAO) and agricultural labor productivity (ALP), of 
transition countries.  Pattern I (CSH): a strong decline in GAO coincides with a strong 
increase in ALP. This is the pattern followed by Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.  
Pattern II (RUB): a strong decline in GAO coincides with a strong decline in ALP.  Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus are typical examples, but also e.g. Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Azerbaijan and Tajikistan fit within this pattern.  Pattern III (CVA): a strong increase in GAO 
coincides with an, albeit slower, increase in ALP.  Examples are China, Viet Nam, and also 
Albania. 
2 There is also a view that individualization of agricultural production leads to subsistence 
farming, which is seen as a survival strategy and usually associated with low productivity 
(Kostov and Lingard and Sarris et al.). 
3 All previous studies of agricultural sector performance apply pooled or cross-section 
regressions (Macours and Swinnen 2000a and 2000b; Lerman 2000 and 2001). There are also 
several studies analyzing technical or total factor productivity across farm types but only in a 
few transition countries and using, not always representative, farm survey data (e.g., Mathijs 
and Swinnen 2001; Davidova et al.; Gorton and Davidova).  
4 The gap between productivity levels of the Soviet agriculture and agriculture in market 
economies reached 100%-150% depending on the particular estimation scheme used. 
5 In the augmented version of the Solow model investment in human capital is an additional 
determinant of growth in output per worker.  For a detailed discussion on the Solow model 
refer for example to Mankiw et al. and Barro and Sala-i-Martin.   16
6 The sample includes: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and 
Ukraine.   
7 The main data sources were the National Statistical Offices, FAO, OECD, EBRD, and the 
World Bank.   
8 See chapter 2 of the EBRD Transition Report 2002 for a detailed definition of these 
indicators.  
9 These indexes are based on a principal component analysis. See Box 2.1 of the EBRD 
Transition Report 1999 and the Technical Note to chapter 4 of the EBRD Transition Report 
2002 for more details.  
10 Results reported are under the assumption that all right-hand site variables are 
predetermined.  Versions of the regressions where investment and growth in labor force are 
assumed endogenous were also run but the results were not importantly different.  These 
alternative treatments are available upon request.   
11 Assessing the sensitivity of this result to alternative assumptions about endogeneity of the 
individualization variable show that results reported are robust.   
   17
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Table 1 Land reforms, farm restructuring and the changes in agricultural indicators over the 1990 – 2000 period 
 




b  Land reform  Region Country 
GAO
w 
c  GAO 
d  Pre-reform 1995  2000  Progress  index 
e  Procedure 
f 
CEE Czech  Rep  170  73  1  21  26  90 R
 4 
  Hungary  236  77 13  46 51  90  R 
  Poland  88  92 76  82 84  90  - 
  Slovakia  130 62 2  7 9  80  R 
Balkans Albania  110
1  116
1  3 96  90
1  80 DP
 5 
 Bulgaria  62
2  67
2  14 51  56
2  80 R 
  Romania  79  91 14  71 85  80  R 
  Slovenia  115 117 83  93 94  90  - 
Baltics Estonia  138  42  4  53
3  61 90  R 
 Latvia  64  38  4  80
3  89 90  R 
 Lithuania  76  65  9  66  87  90  R 
CIS Belarus  85  57  7  11 14  20  DS
 6 
 Kazakhstan  72
2  56
2  0 5  24
1  50 DS 
 Russia  69  62  2  9  13
1  50 DS 
 Ukraine  54  55  6  16  18
1  60 DS 
Notes: 
a Cumulative index (1990=100); 
b Share of total agricultural land used in individual farms; 
c GAO
w = agricultural labor productivity; 
d GAO = gross agricultural output; 
eProgress index (max=100) of land reform; 
f Dominant form; 
1 Data for 1998; 
2 Data for 1999; 
3 Data for 1996; 
4 R = restitution; 
5 DP = distribution of plots; 
6 DS = distribution 
of shares.  
Sources: EBRD, FAO, ILO, National Statistics, WB 
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w growth  




























lnREFORM -    0.0686 
(0.0319)
** -   0.0654 
(0.0343) 
* 





m1  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
m2  0.13 0.13 0.16 0.15 
Sargan  test  0.87 0.96 0.90 0.90 
Notes: Standard errors robust to general heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses under the coefficients; 
***, ** and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level of significance, respectively; for m1 and m2 and the Sargan test p-





Table 3 Second-step estimation of the impact of initial conditions on GAO
w 
 
Variables Coefficient  Std.  Error 
IC1 0.0056  0.0122 
IC2 -0.0193  0.0167 
Adj. R
2  0.29 
 
 